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Abstract 
As an alternative to commodity-based programming (in-kind aid), Cash Transfer Programming is 
attracting both humanitarian organizations’ and institutional donors’ attention. Unlike in-kind aid, 
Cash Transfer Programming transfers purchasing power directly to beneficiaries in the form of 
currency or vouchers for them to obtain goods and/or services directly from the local market. In 
distributing currency to beneficiaries, the private sector, especially financial service providers, 
plays a prominent role, due to the humanitarian sector’s limited relevant resources. The present 
work unveils challenges for the private and humanitarian sectors, which hinder implementing 
Cash Transfer Programming. Based on primary and secondary qualitative data, the paper presents 
the main characteristics and the mechanisms of Cash Transfer Programming to explore how the 
private sector is involved with Cash Transfer Programming. Then, this study presents bottlenecks 
of reciprocal relationships between financial service providers and humanitarian organizations in 
Cash Transfer Programming. 
Key words: Cash Transfer Programming, Humanitarian Response, Financial Service Providers, 
Private Sector.  
1. Introduction  
Conducting efficient, effective and fair humanitarian operations is an earnest desire of 
humanitarian organizations (HOs). For the attainment of this goal, Cash Transfer Programming 
(CTP) has attracted HOs’ increasing attention as an alternative to in-kind assistance (commodity-
based programming) (Harvey and Bailey, 2011, Ali and Gelsdorf, 2012). For the delivery of both, 
cash and in-kind aids, HOs are entering into partnerships with the private sector as a means to 
address the complex humanitarian problems that exceed the ability of a single organization and 
sector and to offer better services and products to beneficiaries (Nurmala et al., 2017, Van 
Wassenhove, 2006).  
 
CTP aims to transfer purchasing power directly to households and individuals in the form of cash 
or vouchers for them to obtain goods and/or services directly from the local market. CTP allows 
beneficiaries to access health services, food, transportation and education by providing them with 
cash, vouchers or electronic transfers (Doocy et al., 2011, Adato & Bassett, 2008). Despite the 
increasing use of CTP in humanitarian aid, it accounted for only 10% of humanitarian assistance 
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in 2016 (CaLP,2018). To boost the share of CTP based aid, the humanitarian sector and major 
institutional donors launch international and comprehensive efforts (CaLP, 2017). For example, 
via the Grand Bargain signed at the World Humanitarian Summit 2016 in Istanbul, Turkey, major 
donors and HOs made a public commitment to increase the share of CTP in their humanitarian 
responses (Grand Bargain, 2016).  
 
Previous relevant research (Doocy et al., 2011, Ali and Gelsdorf, 2012, , Hoddinott et al., 2014, 
Margolies and Hoddinott, 2014, Maunder et al., 2015, Heaslip et al., 2018) on CTP concludes 
that aid provided via CTP allows HOs to achieve more cost-efficient and effective aid than in-
kind aid because CTP enables HOs to employ more straightforward logistics. However, HOs’ 
limited relevant resources and technologies to transfer purchasing power to beneficiaries cause a 
bottleneck in promoting CTP. Thus, the participation of the private sector, especially of financial 
service providers (FSPs), is essential to execute and have CTP prevail (Bailey and Gordo, 2015, 
Andersson et al., 2013). FSPs are entities that provide financial services, including e-transfer 
services. Depending on the context, FSPs include e-voucher companies, financial institutions 
(such as banks and microfinance institutions) (CaLP, 2017a). 
 
Private-humanitarian partnerships are assumed to have positive results for both sides and 
especially for HOs since private companies could provide them with technical expertise, and 
innovative solutions (Cozzolino et al., 2017, Numala et al., 2017, Tomasini and Van 
Wassenhove, 2009). Recent literature on private-humanitarian partnerships focuses on 
relationships between HOs and Logistics Service Providers (LSPs). A research of Bealt et al. 
(2016), explored barriers and benefits of establishing collaborative relationships between HOs 
and LSPs. Lack of trust between partners, poor governance and accountability of HOs as well as 
lack of process and clear visibility are seen as the main barriers for building a successful 
partnership between HOs and LSPs. Cozzolino et al. (2017), explores the contribution of logistics 
service providers’ initiatives to disaster relief and how LSPs are engaged with the humanitarian 
sector. Outsourcing of humanitarian logistics to commercial LSPs is also investigated in Vega 
and Roussat (2015). They found that LSPs could play a significant role in relief response and 
they could take the role of coordinator, operator and partner in the different disaster phases. For 
the implementation of cash aid, financial service providers appear to play an important role by 
providing technology and expertise in transferring money to beneficiaries. Despite the recent 
growth of humanitarian sector’s expectation toward CTP, relevant literature is limited (Tappis 
and Doocy, 2017, Doocy and Tappis, 2016).  
 
A systematic literature review on CTP from Doocy and Tappis (2016) concludes that only nine 
studies are in peer-reviewed publications and none of them focus on the role of the private sector. 
The majority of peer-reviewed articles are case studies about CTP implemented in different 
geographical areas while others modeling the cost efficiency and effectiveness of cash versus in 
kind. For example, applying an economy-wide modelling framework and a social accounting 
matrix to the long-term famine crises of Ethiopia in 2000s, Gelan (2006) uses an economy- wide 
modelling approach to examine the effectiveness and efficiency of cash and in-kind aid. He found 
that cash aid provided efficiency gains from savings on logistics, avoided disincentives to local 
food production and had greater multiplier effects. Margolies and Hoddinott (2014) applies 
activity-based costing methods to interventions in four countries (Ecuador, Niger, Uganda, and 
Yemen) and they have found that the per-transfer cost of providing cash is always less than food. 
Based on a case study of the famine crisis in Somalia in 2011, Ali and Gelsdorf (2012) also 
3 
 
indicates that a large-scale cash program could be even more successful than the distribution of 
foods. Simpson et al. (2017) investigates the parameters which can be measured to determine the 
added value of employing CTP on water and sanitation programs.  
 
To our best knowledge, all previous relevant academic literature (Doocy et al., 2011, Ali and 
Gelsdorf, 2012, Hoddinott et al., 2014, Margolies and Hoddinott, 2014 Maunder et al., 2015) is 
evidence-based research which focuses on the effectiveness of CTP versus in-kind aid. Another 
stream of modelling literature of CTPs investigates the relationship between cash and education 
and nutrition of beneficiaries in development aid. Combining modeling techniques and evidence 
data, researchers found that conditional cash is positively correlated with education and school 
enrollment and school attendance (De Janvry et al.,2006, Filmer and Schady, 2011, Glewwe and 
Kassouf, 2012). Also, previous research shows that cash transfers have demonstrated large 
impacts on health and nutrition of children (Adato and Bassett, 2009, Paxson and Schady, 2010). 
Exceptionally, Andersson et al. (2013) addresses a bottleneck of CTP associated with HOs’ 
limited abilities to implement CTP. The authors indicate that HOs participating in the political 
crisis of Bosnia in 1997 did not have the necessary skills and resources to implement CTP 
smoothly. Despite the fact that the private sector plays an essential role in the execution of CTP, 
academic research, which sheds light on this area, is limited. Recently, Heaslip et al. (2018) 
explores the CTPs’ impact on humanitarian logistics from the perspective of supply chain 
strategies. Based on empirical data, the authors conclude that developing strategic partnerships 
between commercial companies and aid agencies is a determinant of successful CTPs. However, 
they do not conduct an in-depth analysis on the issue, including obstacles to overcome for 
partnerships between the private and humanitarian sectors. 
 
The present exploratory study focuses on the role of the private sector, specifically of FSPs in the 
delivery of CTP. It also analyzes the mechanism of CTP, which would expose benefits, risks and 
challenges. We employ a qualitative approach accessing primary data from interviews with 
experts from HOs and the private sector and secondary data from HOs’ and institutional donors’ 
reports as well as from academic articles. We have interviewed cash experts in HOs (DRC, NRC, 
CRS, WFP, Red Cross, and Welthungerhilfe), DG ECHO of the European Commission and from 
private sector MasterCard and the RedRose, which is a private technology company that offers 
software for the execution of CTPs. We have also talked to two independent consultants who are 
collaborating with HOs and with development agencies for CTP. In addition, Cash Learning 
Partnership (CaLP) and UNHCR provided us with useful documents for this research. The 
interviews are conducted from July 2017 to October 2017. Table 1 presents the organizations that 
we have interviewed. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Following the section of introduction, section 2 
overviews the mechanism of CTP. After overviewing CTP, in section 3, we discuss advantages 
and disadvantages associated with the implementation of CTP from the perspective of HOs and 
beneficiaries. Section 4 discusses private sector’s motivation to participate in CTP and associated 
challenges. Lastly, section 5 presents conclusions and future research avenues.  
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Organization  Country  Date  
Danish Refugee Council (DRC) Denmark  July 2017 
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) USA July 2017 
DG ECHO (European Commission) Belgium  July 2017 
Consultant of CTPs for HOs France July 2017 
Consultant of CTPs for HOs USA July 2017 
WFP Italy July 2017 
Red Cross  Canada  September  
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) Norway  October 2017 
Welthungerhilfe Germany  November 2017 
MasterCard USA September 2017 
RedRose  UK September 2017 
  
Table 1: List of the interviews 
2. Overview on the mechanism of CTP 
As preliminary information to discussions in sections 4 and 5, this section elaborates on the 
mechanism of CTP in terms of three aspects: relevant stakeholders in CTP, decision criteria that 
HOs apply to implement CTP, and delivery mechanism that HOs utilize to transfer purchasing 
power to beneficiaries. Looking into the mechanism of CTP allows us to recognize how the 
private sector is involved with CTP.  
a. Stakeholders 
Many indispensable stakeholders are involved with CTP. They are: HOs, donors (private and 
institutional), the private sector (FSPs, suppliers, logistics providers, wholesalers and retailers), 
national government and beneficiaries. The following explains each of the stakeholders in detail 
to obtain an insight on their roles and interactions.  
 
HOs: HOs are acting as implementing agencies for CTP. The role of HOs is to establish the 
mechanism for providing cash to beneficiaries, monitoring and evaluating the conditions and 
managing the data collected from the field. HOs are also responsible for managing all contracts 
with financial and logistics providers for the distribution of cash as well as to coordinate the 
partnerships with other HOs and the private sector.  
 
Donors: Donors include institutional donors (e.g., European Commission Humanitarian Office 
(ECHO)) and private donors. HOs rely on donations from private and institutional donors to 
operate CTP. In terms of donated money to HOs, discrepancies between private and institutional 
donors can be observed. Unlike private donors, institutional donors usually execute their 
discretion over how HOs must use their donated funds, either for CTP or for in-kind 
programming. In many cases, their decisions are based on political criteria. In our interviews, a 
cash expert from CRS explained “some countries like US have recently decreased the amount of 
money given for CTP and they are funding more in-kind programs because they want to minimize 
the chances that pure cash will be used by potential terrorists.” We have also found that 
institutional donors are willing to contract FSPs directly for CTPs, instead of via HOs. This new 
trend of fund flow from donors is discussed in detail in section 4.  
5 
 
 
Private sector and FSPs: The private sector includes financial and logistics service providers, 
suppliers of technologies, retailers and wholesalers in the affected areas. The private sector, 
especially FSPs, plays an essential role as a partner of HOs, in terms of planning, assessments, 
implementation, and preparedness for CTP. The private sector uses its own existing 
infrastructure, so that it can shorten implementation time and reduce costs, security risks as well 
as duplication of efforts (World Bank, 2016). Private provides services and products that HOs are 
either unable to provide or which they can provide in a better way (Hoxtell et al., 2015). The role 
of the private sector is discussed in detail in section 4.  
 
National governments: National governments usually run large scale cash programs and have the 
regulations in place to allow or reject CTP. In many cases, national governments have strong 
ownership and leadership of CTP in their countries. HOs are required to collaborate and use the 
existing infrastructure at the national level to achieve effectiveness and efficiency of CTP (World 
Bank, 2016). FSPs also have to follow national regulations with respect to data privacy and cash 
transfer in affected areas. A financial expert from MasterCard explained in our interview, “we 
always follow the laws that each country has in place with respect to cash transfers and we 
always sign agreements with organizations for data privacy”.  
 
Beneficiaries: Beneficiaries may be defined at an individual or household level, and may be 
selected based on geography, age, wealth status, vulnerabilities or other characteristics specific to 
the needs of the humanitarian basis. Depending on their family situations, HOs usually provide 
cash to a member of the family and not to each individual within the family (World Bank, 2016). 
 
b.  HOs’ decision criteria for the implementation of CTP 
This subsection introduces a typical HO’s decision-making criterion applied when they determine 
the implementation of CTP.  
 
HOs’ decision-making processes consists of three major steps: market analysis, risk analysis and 
selection of response options (i.e., how to deliver CTP). First, HOs assess whether the market or a 
neighboring market can supply goods; then, they examine accessibility to markets. Market 
assessment aims to confirm the impact of introducing CTP on the local market in an affected 
area. Market assessment also helps to distinguish between goods and services which can be 
purchased locally, or which require direct delivery or complementary support from HOs. HOs 
also look into interventions by governments and other humanitarian organizations, which would 
positively or negatively affect the total supply chain. Following the step of market analysis, HOs 
conduct risk analysis. If HOs recognize security issues, then they decide to use vouchers or e-
cash as a distribution measure. 
 
The next step is the selection of response options. In this step, HOs look into the necessity of 
providing beneficiaries with some tasks (i.e., either conditional or unconditional CTP). 
Conditional cash transfers require that recipients meet certain requirements before the transfer is 
fulfilled. Cash transfers with conditions are those given after the recipients have performed some 
tasks or activities as a condition of receiving the cash transfer (CaLP, 2017a). Unconditional cash 
transfers are direct cash with no conditions or work requirements with the assumption that money 
will be used to meet basic needs or be invested in livelihoods. (CaLP, 2017a). Unconditional cash 
transfers are usually common in the aftermath of a disaster to cover the first needs of the affected 
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populations. If the initial market assessment indicates that the local market does not have the 
capacity, then HOs either help local traders to build their capacities or provide in-kind aid from 
international markets.  
 
At the same time, HOs examine the conditions and liquidity of the local financial systems. Our 
interviews reveal that liquidity issues can occur which result in delays on the delivery of cash to 
beneficiaries. In this case, HO look for alternative solutions either by physically importing cash 
of goods. In addition, HOs need to pay attention to the impact of currency exchange rates in the 
local black market in affected areas since some vendors only accept the unofficial exchange rate. 
Figure 1 presents the decision- making process which HOs apply in executing CTPs.  
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Figure 1: Decision Tree of HOs for CTPs based on empirical findings 
 
Can the local or neighboring 
market supply goods and 
services? 
3. Response 
Options  
1. Market Analysis 
Yes 
Does the local 
market have a 
limited capacity and 
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Is it safe to distribute cash? Is it 
safe for beneficiaries to receive 
cash or carry cash? 
Are beneficiaries expected to 
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receiving cash? 
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cash 
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markets  
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2. Provide unconditional 
cash  
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4. Support local traders to 
rebuild the market and 
provide cash to beneficiaries  
Yes 
3. Provide vouchers or 
e-transfers  
 NO 
     
NO 
NO 
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c. Delivery Mechanism 
Once HOs determine to employ CTP, they next select the means of delivering cash or voucher 
transfer to beneficiaries. Based on primary and secondary data, this subsection explains the 
delivery mechanism of CTP.  
 
Depending on conditions of the affected areas, CTP has the following four different means of 
delivering: cash in hand, commodity vouchers, e-cash and hawala transfer system. Regardless of 
the modalities and delivery mechanism, cash is transferred to beneficiaries either conditionally or 
unconditionally, as explained in subsection 2.b.  
 
Cash in hand, in envelopes or cheques: Beneficiaries are provided with money directly from a 
HO or a third-party provider. Our interview with a cash expert from CRS confirmed that cash in 
hand is employed in “very remote areas, where there is no infrastructure and FSPs are not 
present. Also, we use them in the very first days of the response in order to give beneficiaries 
money to cover their first needs”. Case in hand requires that HOs have sufficient cash flow, staff 
members and logistics support. Security in transporting and distributing cash and the acceptance 
by local authorities is essential. Cash in hand is cost efficient because no transfer equipment and 
no literacy skills as well as training for beneficiaries are required. However, organizing logistics 
support for cash distribution to rural areas would generate costs. Additionally, during the process 
of cash distribution, corruption and/or security risks for staff members in charge of transportation 
need to be considered. Logistics providers which distribute cash and/or financial providers which 
issue checks are involved.  
 
Cash or commodity vouchers: cash or commodity vouchers, for example, coupons, tokens or 
smartcards, magnetic stripe cards, which can only be used in particular shops and/or on particular 
items from local markets are used from HOs. Private sector is involved with CTP as the supplier 
of coupons, tokens or smartcards and as a retailer of items in case of commodity vouchers. 
Voucher is a useful to collect data on beneficiaries’ preferences. The data are used by HOs to 
avoid item shortages. As confirmed by an interviewed humanitarian expert, his organization has 
employed a private company to collect and analyze beneficiaries’ consumption data. These data 
are then given to HOs to be used in future interventions: “our providers not only distribute cash 
to beneficiaries, but also monitor our programs and analyze data on beneficiaries’ purchase 
preference.” mentioned by a cash expert from Welthungerhilfe organization.  
 
FSPs are also involved in cash or commodity vouchers, especially in using smartcards or 
magnetic stripe cards which need to link an agency bank account to an individual bank account. 
The use of smartcards or magnetic stripe cards require connectivity and related infrastructure that 
can read and authenticate the card such as PoS and ATMs, which generate additional costs for 
HOs. In the process of implementing, smartcards or magnetic stripe cards, HOs provide FSPs 
with beneficiaries’ ID information. Although, these modalities can speed the delivery of cash, 
they require training for the beneficiaries on how to use the cards, ATMs and on how to manage 
their PINs.  
 
E-cash: Recently, HOs are using e-cash for humanitarian interventions. E-cash is used in 34% of 
all CTPs around the world (CaLP, 2017). Many HOs are using mobiles to transfer cash. The 
system is based on SMS codes to beneficiaries’ mobile phones which can be cashed out at a 
specific shop in affected areas. E-cash reduces total distribution costs for HOs as well as program 
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recipients’ costs of obtaining the cash transfer (Aker et al., 2011). A cash expert from CRS 
elaborated that the use of e-cash is easier and more practical in developed countries and can 
support also the new phenomenon of refugees on the move: “…mobile transfers are increasingly 
used for the Syrian refugees especially in countries such Greece. For the beneficiaries on the 
move such as the refugees who moved from Turkey to Greece and from there to Germany, mobile 
and credit cards are the most appropriate modalities to use since they can use them in each 
country where they go”. E-cash requires connectivity to a network, training to beneficiaries on 
how to use it and the ID of beneficiaries. E-transfers could also involve biometric technologies, 
such as iris scanning technology to authenticate identities. E-cash has the highest level of 
preference among beneficiaries who either have previous familiarity and capacity to utilize 
technologies, such as phones (Creti, 2014). FSPs, suppliers of advanced technologies and 
retailers at the local markets are involved in e-transfers.  
 
Hawala transfer system: In some cases, HOs are using the so called hawala transfer system. 
Hawala system is an informal money transfer system which is based on the trust that enables the 
transfer or remittance of money between two parties in a fast and inexpensive manner, without 
the direct involvement of a financial institution (Redín et al., 2014, p.327). This type of system 
was originally developed to facilitate trade between distant regions, where conventional banking 
institutions were either absent, incapable or unsafe. In some cases, this system is used by HOs to 
distribute cash to areas where formal financial institutions are inaccessible or do not exist and in 
unsecure areas, for example in Somalia and Syria.  
 
A standard hawala transaction can be described as follows: a HO approaches a hawala dealer—
called hawaladar -to request the transfer of money to another city or country or to a remote area. 
If they agree on the fees of services, the hawaladar contacts another hawaladar in the area of 
destination who organizes the delivery of money to the recipient. The beneficiary receives the 
money within a few hours since the remitting person ordered the transfer. As a result of this 
operation, an “outstanding debt between both hawaladars, which will have to be canceled out in 
the future, is generated.” (Redín et al., 2014, p.328). It is actually a transfer of money without 
actual movement of money. A cash expert from NRC explained in our interviews: “this system 
provides the means to transfer money without a legal contract between the entry and the exit 
point…because the system is informal, we need an information system that can be used to track 
the money flow to beneficiaries and to report back to donors. Donors need a guarantee that their 
money is successfully delivered”.  
3. Advantages and Disadvantages of CTP from HOs’ and beneficiaries’ perspectives 
To better understand HOs’ motivations to use CTP, this section overviews advantages and 
disadvantages linked to CTP from the perspective of HOs and beneficiaries.  
 
Advantages: Previous relevant references agree that CTP would respect beneficiaries’ individual 
choice, which actually contributes to reducing the mismatch between beneficiaries’ needs and 
HOs’ aid (Doocy et al., 2011, Glewwe and Muralidharan, 2015, UNHCR, 2016). Previous 
research (Doocy et al., 2011, Glewwe and Muralidharan, 2015, Maunder et al., 2015, UNHCR, 
2016) indicates cost-efficiency of humanitarian aid as a major advantage of CTP. CTP is also 
expected to facilitate monitoring of its impact on households, markets, and communities. A cash 
expert from DRC explained “… CTP can provide more comprehensive feedback on people’s 
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needs, vulnerabilities, and coping strategies in addition to the humanitarian impact on local 
contexts and communities.”  
 
Disadvantages: Although CTP empowers recipients by allowing them to decide how the cash 
would be spent and it raises the bargaining power of women in the decision making (De Brauw et 
al., 2014), CTP may have inadvertently reinforced the traditional role of women of being 
responsible for daily household keeping (Soares and Silva, 2010). CTP could also affect the 
power balance within household members and within community members, which sometime 
ignites a conflict between recipients and non-recipients. Defining targeted beneficiaries who 
enjoy aid by CTP is a sensitive task for HOs because the task often has inclusion and exclusion 
errors (Andersson et al., 2013). The errors would cause security risks both for beneficiaries and 
HOs: “beneficiaries who receive and organizations which deliver cash could be a target,” said a 
cash expert from WFP. 
 
HOs also need to pay attention to the negative impact of CTP on the local market, such as 
inflation caused by supply shortages and/or price control by oligopolistic or monopolistic firms. 
During the market assessment, HOs ensure whether the supply is reliable, prices are affordable, 
and markets will be able to respond to increases in demand which result from cash infusions 
without negative distortions (Doocy and Tapis, 2016). 
4. Private sector participation in CTPs 
HOs’ partnership with FSPs is an essential element in delivering cash to beneficiaries (Bailey and 
Gordon, 2015). This section highlights why FSPs are interested in participating in CTP and what 
their main opportunities are. This section also discusses bottlenecks for the further growth of 
reciprocal relationships between private and humanitarian sectors in CTP. Furthermore, based on 
our interview results, we discuss the new trend of donation flows from institutional donors to 
FSPs as well as its potential impact on HOs.  
 
 FSPs’ motivation for participating in CTP 
Three key drivers have been identified in relation to engagement of FSPs in CTP. As previous 
literature (Johnson et al., 2010, Bailey and Gordon, 2015) indicates, our interviews also confirm 
that FSPs’ pursuance of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is one of their main motivations to 
engage with CTP. New business opportunities and the related profits are also FSPs major drivers 
to participate in CTP. FSPs recognize CTP as a fast-moving industry which allows them to enter 
into new markets and to develop new innovative technological products. Technology is changing 
the way HOs provide assistance, from experimenting with blockchain technology to provide cash 
to the use of biometrics to register and track beneficiary assistance through iris scans and 
fingerprinting (Sandvik, 2017). Established companies such as Visa and MasterCard are working 
together with UN agencies and other HOs to develop new technological solutions in distributing 
CTPs and help HOs to scale up CTPs (Harvey et al., 2011, p. 25).  
 
As the financial expert from MasterCard explained, “I think that there are multiple motivations 
behind the engagement of private sector in CTPs. The nature of crises is complex, and it needs a 
cross-sector thinking and analysis on how to do things differently…So, first is that we want to 
help, second there is an innovation angle. Taking a part in humanitarian operations gives us an 
opportunity to learn peoples’ needs and to develop robust products and services. Third, 
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participation in humanitarian response is a marketing tool for the company to attract young 
talents and also there is a commercial aspect and the sustainable growth both for the societies 
and companies.”  
 
Bottlenecks for further growth of reciprocal relationships between FSPs and HOs 
Analysis of our interview results leads to the conclusion that challenges related to collaboration 
between private and humanitarian sectors stem from the two sectors’ perception gaps. 
Specifically, they are: knowledge on finance, governance structure, market competition and 
services offered, as well as humanitarian data protection.  
 
Knowledge on finance: One of the challenges of the relationships between FSPs and HOs is the 
different expertise that may result in communication gaps and different perceptions. Bailey and 
Gordon (2015) discusses that HOs are in a new territory, where they need to manage a significant 
amount of money and deliver it to thousands of beneficiaries. A humanitarian expert that 
provides consultancy to HOs confirmed, “HOs do not speak the financial language and are not 
familiar with national and international financial regulations. Actually, they do not know what 
they don’t know.” Humanitarian experts recognize that CTP could not be executed effectively 
and efficiently without FSPs: “we (HOs) really need FSPs’ expertise, we cannot manage cash 
transfers without banks and the system behind… financial service providers are more effective 
and adapt quickly to our needs in some of the most difficulties places that we work” as a cash 
expert from NRC mentioned. HOs may need additional resources and more expert personnel to 
manage the relationships with FSPs.  
 
Governance structure and planning horizon differences: We learn from our interviews that the 
discrepancy of governance structures of FSPs and HOs hampers their collaboration in CTP. FSPs 
take centralized governance models, which allows them to execute faster decision making. In 
contrast, HOs usually take decentralized governance models, which enable the field to enjoy 
autonomy and flexibility in its decision making for rapidly changing affected areas’ 
circumstances.  
 
Budget planning discrepancies between the two sectors also block collaboration in CTP. The 
humanitarian sector applies a project-based and short-term budget planning. As a cash expert 
from Red Cross confirmed, “We usually get grants and donations after a disaster occurs, but we 
try to establish framework agreements with FSPs in different countries before disasters as part of 
our preparation plan.” FSPs, on the other hand, usually work on long-term plans and need 
information for planning, such as information about the next few years’ programs. HOs face 
difficulties to provide this kind of information, partly due to the nature of their work and their 
limited resources to work on forecasting and projections (Bailey and Gordon, 2015).  
 
Market competition and service offered: HOs demand tailored solutions to adapt to the 
environment where they operate. This adaptation may not be affordable for FSPs in that the 
market is not large enough to pursue tailored services. FSPs are risk averse when it comes to 
tailored solutions: “we (FSPs) are thinking very much on scale basis which requires us to be a bit 
more conservative on what we offer, and we are not promising a lot in terms of customization. 
We explain what our technology does and if it does not fit the operations of our partners, we do 
not collaborate…” as confirmed by MasterCard expert.  
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Humanitarian data protection: Concerns about beneficiaries’ privacy and data protection and 
security associated with private sector involvement in CTP are raised. Financial transfers require 
that those sending and receiving money must know their customers; however, data privacy and 
humanitarian regulations require protection of beneficiaries’ personal data (Bailey and Gordon, 
2015). In e-transfers, the personal data is more extensive than in in-kind aid and has to be shared 
with FSPs. Also, the use of the newest technologies that require biometric data, such as iris 
scanning, is considered as an affront to beneficiaries’ human dignity (WFP, 2016). “We protect 
our beneficiaries, we do not give names to banks, we give them a number linked to a 
beneficiary,” said a cash expert from WFP. However, it is common practice for HOs to have 
agreements with the providers on private and confidential data protection of beneficiaries.  
 
The Know Your Customer (KYC) regulations, which are applied to all FSPs, refer to the ID 
checks that financial institutions perform to comply with national financial regulations. KYC is 
designed to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and other related threats to the 
financial system (Elan, 2017). HOs are not subject to KYC regulations directly, but via the FSPs. 
An additional challenge related to KYC regulations is that many beneficiaries often have no 
identity documents. Thus, HOs have to find alternatives to serve them. FSPs show some 
understanding to the circumstance that HOs face. However, FSPs are reluctant about risks related 
to data security. An expert from MasterCard explained, “I think it is a public and private effort to 
understand how to work together on how to secure data from vulnerable people. From the 
private sector perspective, I think there is no single company that wants to associate with 
organizations or situations which are involved in data security issues because it is a reputational 
issue for us”.  
 
Signs of new donation flows from institutional donors: Our interviews also reveal a new trend of 
fund flows from donors. Intuitional donors, such as ECHO, are willing to contract directly the 
private sector, instead of via HOs, to execute CTPs. Institutional donors consider that the directly 
contract with the private sector could enable donated cash to reach beneficiaries faster and 
inexpensively (ECHO, 2017). As an interviewed cash expert from DRC explained, “what ECHO 
tries to do is to eliminate financial costs. They are working a lot with UN and that’s very 
inefficient from their perspective. They are spending 3% for the financial service providers and 
then they add a 13% to 15% to UN to manage these contracts. It’s pretty silly. For other HOs, 
(overhead and plus the operational costs) are a bit less, which is 7%; however, that’s still 7% 
overhead and plus the operational costs in the country. It is understandable why ECHO wants to 
do it”.  
 
The private sector is positive to this initiative, “we are very excited about this initiative since this 
is the work that we know how to do it and donors should take advantage of our expertise,” 
highlighted an expert from MasterCard. Issues related to the ownership of the programs and 
management of the data are related with this direct partnership between institutional donors and 
FSPs. An interviewed cash expert from DRC said, “…there is an issue of the ownership of the 
data, which is not clear on the guidance of ECHO. UNHCR collects data of refugees, but with the 
new plan of ECHO, who manages the data? If ECHO contracts directly the private sector, then 
who is handing the data?” The new trend in the flow of donations from institutional donors 
directly to FSPs may end up decreasing donations to HOs. A cash expert from NRC said, “we 
clearly need to communicate to donors and especially to private donors the importance and the 
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value of the other phases of CTP like assessment, targeting and registration to receive funding.” 
This evolution may affect the role of HOs in the humanitarian response.  
5. Conclusions and future research  
The presented work makes a unique contribution to studies on CTP in that it sheds light on the 
reciprocal relationship between the private and humanitarian sectors. The Private sector’s 
participation is essential for a successful implementation of CTP due to the humanitarian sector’s 
lack of the relevant expertise. Despite the essential role of the private sector in CTP, no study has 
explored the partnership between these two sectors in CTP. To fill in this research gap, we have 
first overviewed the mechanism of CTP. Specifically, we have looked into the mechanism from 
the three key perspectives: stakeholders in CTP, HOs’ decision criteria which support their 
determination on an appropriate CTP option, and CTP actually used in delivering cash to 
beneficiaries. Furthermore, through a series of interviews, we have discovered challenges related 
to those three perspectives. 
 
Looking into the observed interaction between the private and humanitarian sectors in CTP, this 
research unveils challenges, which would hinder partnerships between the two sectors. In 
addition, our interviews reveal private sector’s motivation to be involved with CTP. Regarding 
the private sector’s motivation, interviewed private companies are involved with CTP not only 
for their pursuance of corporate social responsibility goals, but also for an opportunity to develop 
robust products and services under various extreme circumstances. Concerning challenges for 
establishing partnerships in CTP, we identify that the challenges are attributable to five 
perception gaps (knowledge on finance, governance structure, market competition and services 
offered and humanitarian data protection). We have also discussed recent new donation flows 
accompanied by CTP, in which funds are sent from institutional donors directly to the private 
sector, rather than via the humanitarian sector.  
 
In closing the paper, we highlight three avenues for future research. We find signs of new 
donation flows from donors through our interviews. Institutional donors are increasingly willing 
to contract directly FSPs in CTP because they consider that cash would reach beneficiaries more 
efficiently. This new trend of donation flows would warrant further research on dynamics 
between the two sectors as actors is humanitarian response. Secondly, considering that CTP rely 
on donations collected after a disaster, stakeholders need to consider consequences of liquidity 
problems. Horizontal cooperation can be observed for in-kind aid by the United Nations 
Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD). The applicability evaluation of a horizontal 
cooperation system to CTP between HOs is worth exploring. Lastly, we recognize that the 
hawala system transfers money without a legal contract between the entry and the exit points. 
What kind of information systems should be designed for the informal cash flow from the 
perspective of vendors and HOs is a promising future research area. 
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